Can You Spell Stagflation?
I see no 'stag' or 'flation' says the Fed...
MOST economists don't believe we could have stagflation today, writes
Jim Rickards in The Daily
Reckoning.
The
prevailing view is that recessions are characterized by higher unemployment and reduced spending, and
inflation is triggered by full
employment and increased spending. Therefore they cannot both happen at the same time.
This prevailing view
is wrong, yet it's a powerful narrative that blinds most analysts to situations where stagnation and
inflation are both happening at
the same time.
That's stagflation, and it is emerging today.
The first wing of the
stagflation thesis is stagnant growth. This can take the form of an outright recession (two consecutive
quarters of declining GDP) or
simply slow growth at a rate below the potential growth of a strong economy.
The US economy has grown in
recent years, but growth has remained below historical averages.
What growth we
have had wasn't due to
monetary policy. It's been the result of extreme fiscal policy including annual deficits that are now
approaching $3 trillion per
year. Fiscal policy that involves direct government deficit spending does produce growth that monetary
policy cannot. The question is:
at what cost?
Basic Keynesian economics holds that government spending at a
time of recession or when
consumer savings are too high can stimulate growth. If the national debt is moderate, it's possible to
get more than $1.00 of growth
for $1.00 of government spending financed by borrowing.
Today, these conditions
don't apply.
The national debt-to-GDP ratio is 134%, the highest in US history. Government spending is
often directed at
non-productive projects such as the Green New Scam and subsidizing illegal immigration.
When debt rises
faster than GDP, which it presently is, the debt-to-GDP ratio grows, and the Keynesian multiplier
shrinks. You are trying to borrow
and spend your way out of a debt crisis, which can only end in default (unnecessary since the US can
print Dollars) or hyperinflation
(likely).
Those extreme outcomes (default or hyperinflation) happen in the
endgame, which can be years away.
What happens in the meantime is not much better.
Any debt-to-GDP ratio above
90% will produce a Keynesian
multiplier of less than 100%. With a debt-to-GDP ratio of 134% the US can only expect more debt and
weaker growth from fiscal
policy.
This may provide a short-term boost for Biden in an election year, but
it's a long-term drag on
growth for the US In the end, the US is now Japan. The Japanese debt-to-GDP ratio is about
300%.
Japan has
been in one long depression since 1990 punctuated by nine separate technical recessions. Japan cannot
"stimulate" its way to growth.
They can only continue deficit spending to prop up nominal growth while making their debt ratio and
slow-growth problems
worse.
The US (and much of the world) is following the same path. Stagnation in
the form of weak growth and
occasional recession is the future of the US economy despite recent strong quarters.
As for inflation, there
is no debate. Inflation has been going up for three straight months. In fact, inflation has been in a
persistent range centered around
3.3% for 10 months. Inflation is back. In truth, it never went away.
Oil prices
are one factor. The price of
oil was $68.50 per barrel in. It peaked above $86 in early April and has since pulled back. But the
trend has been higher.
That oil price surge has not worked its way through the supply chain yet. It's resulted in
some price increases, but more
are in the pipeline. It'll keep inflation at current levels or higher in the months ahead.
The Fed is looking
for signs that inflation is coming down but they're not going to get them.
Other factors driving inflation
from the supply side include the Key Bridge collapse in Baltimore, the closing of the Red Sea/Suez Canal
shipping route and continued
fallout from Ukraine war sanctions. Some of these supply side constraints may be deflationary in the
long run but they are definitely
inflationary in the short run.
When you add it all up, the inflation hypothesis
is strong and getting
stronger. Growth is also slowing, as I explained above, so both components of the stagflation thesis are
intact.
But the Fed and their Wall Street toadies can't see that.
That's
because the Fed forecasting
models are junk science. Those models will always get the wrong result. If that's true (it is), and if
Wall Street is following the
Fed (they are), then Wall Street will get the forecast wrong also. It's the blind leading the
blind.
We can
start with the Phillips curve. This model says that there is an inverse correlation between unemployment
and inflation. If
unemployment is low, one should expect inflation to be high, and vice versa. The rationale is that tight
labor markets lead to wage
demands that increase spending and feed inflation.
The problem is there's no
empirical data to support the
model.
In the early 1960s, the US had low unemployment and low inflation. As
late as 1965, inflation was only
1.6%. In the late 1970s, the US had high unemployment and high inflation. Inflation peaked at 13.5% in
1980. Unemployment that year
was 7.8%.
Unemployment peaked at 10.8% in November 1982. Inflation that year
was still 6.1%. In the 1930s,
the US had high unemployment and low inflation (actually deflation). Unemployment was estimated at about
24% in 1932. Inflation that
year was negative 10.3%.
In 1973-1975, the US had low unemployment and high
inflation. In October 1973
unemployment was only 4.6%. Inflation that year was 6.2% on its way to 11.1% in 1974.
In other words, the
Phillips curve is junk science. There are many causes of both unemployment and inflation, but a strict
inverse relationship is not one
of them.
The Fed also takes the view that interest rate cuts offer "stimulus"
and interest rate hikes offer
"monetary tightening". That's also false.
During times of severe economic
distress (the Great Depression is a
good example), interest rates drop to near zero. When economies are booming, interest rates rise because
companies are competing for
more funds to expand capacity and to make investments.
Things can go too far.
High rates will eventually lead
to overcapacity and recession. Low rates will eventually lead to investment opportunities and a new
expansion. But those turning
points happen at the extremes as part of a normal business cycle. In the normal state of affairs, higher
rates are associated with
good times and low rates are associated with recessions or worse.
The Fed has
this exactly backward. The Fed
doesn't lead the business cycle, it chases it.
In short, the Fed is persisting
in tight monetary policy in
order to fight inflation. But this inflation is caused by supply-side disruptions (oil and
transportation bottlenecks) and a range of
other factors the Fed doesn't control.
The Fed is tightening into what may
quickly become a recession. This
is a recipe for stagflation.











Email
us