Investing in Vision, Bullsh*t and Fraud
Investment lessons from We and other disasters...
It is SOMETHING of a truism within the advertising industry that good
advertising is the best way to
destroy a bad product, writes Tim Price of Price Value
Partners.
The theory is that when people then try out the
aforesaid
bad product, and are hugely disappointed by its failings, they lose no time in telling their friends
about its demerits,
too.
A variation on this theme has to do with the triumph of cheapness over
quality; as Benjamin Franklin is
believed to have said,
"The bitterness of poor quality remains long after the
sweetness of low price is
forgotten."
(Those words will come to be engraved on the hearts of all ETF
equity investors after the next
bear market in stocks – which might well have just started.)
But there's a
paradox here, notably for asset
managers, and especially for those setting up new businesses.
On the one hand,
you don't necessarily want to
advertise your business, at least in any 'mass market' way that might attract short-term customers not
necessarily aligned with your
own process.
But on the other hand, how can you possibly tell your target
market about your product, service
or fund?
'Isaiah's Job' gets to the heart of the dilemma. You set out your
stall and put out your message as
best you can, and hope that some amongst 'the Remnant' will find it, and respond sympathetically to
it.
Whatever our religious convictions, we have a strong belief in the power of honest communications.
Happily, today, the worldwide web,
independent media and social media offer a way to at least try and address your target market without
sacrificing your
principles.
Operating a website today is more or less costless. If you operate
a website, you also have the
potential for the equivalent of a television channel. If you operate a website, you also have the
potential for the equivalent of a
radio station – again, at virtually negligible cost. Which is one reason why, together with a technical
analyst friend, Paul
Rodriguez, we now record free, regular interviews with fellow professionals to discuss the state of the
markets. We encourage you to
dip into our archive.
And it has long been a principle of ours never to engage
with fund management companies
that deploy mass market (paid-for) advertising. Going further, we believe asset management should be a
cottage industry. Fund managers
have (or at least should have) a fiduciary obligation to their clients, that puts the clients' interests
first. Mass market asset
gathering firms are simply not capable of engaging with their customers on that basis.
The chief investment
officer of one of the most successful investment funds in the world, the Yale Endowment, David Swensen,
wrote an excellent book
entitled 'Unconventional Success'. Over the past 30 years, Yale has enjoyed an average annualised return
of over 12%. That title is an
allusion to Keynes' famous observation that fund managers, courtesy of endemic groupthink, tend to
prefer (and consequently often
deliver) conventional failure as opposed to unconventional success.
Swensen in
his book pulls few punches.
The fund management industry, for example, involves the "interaction between sophisticated,
profit-seeking providers of financial
services [Keynes would have called them rentiers] and naïve, return-seeking consumers of investment
products.
"The drive for profits by Wall Street and the mutual fund industry overwhelms the concept of fiduciary
responsibility, leading to an
all too predictable outcome: except in an inconsequential number of cases where individuals succeed
through unusual skill or
unreliable luck, the powerful financial services industry exploits vulnerable individual
investors."
The
nature of ownership is crucial to the likely end return. To Swensen,
"The
ownership structure of a fund
management company plays a role in determining the likelihood of investor success. Mutual fund investors
face the greatest challenge
with investment management companies that provide returns to public shareholders or that funnel profits
to a corporate parent –
situations that place the conflict between profit generation and fiduciary responsibility in high
relief.
"When a funds management subsidiary reports to a multiline financial services company, the scope for
abuse of investor capital
broadens dramatically. In contrast, private for-profit investment management organizations enjoy the
option of playing the role of a
benevolent capitalist, mitigating the drive for profits with concern for investor returns."
In plainer
English, the more mouths standing between you and your money that need to be fed, the poorer the
ultimate investment return outcome is
likely to be. In a rational world, investors would be well advised to favour smaller, entrepreneurial
boutiques, or private
partnerships, over larger, publicly listed full service investment operations – especially subsidiaries
of banks or insurance
companies – with all kinds of intermediary layers craving their share of your pie.
So before buying any fund,
ask yourself some questions:
How big is it? The tree cannot grow to the sky.
But try telling that to
Blackrock, or to the average member of the Investment Association, or even to Vanguard, the world's
largest provider of passive funds
(at a time when we would argue the need for discrimination in investment choices has never been higher).
Managers' pay is invariably
linked to the size of funds under management. The more assets, the more pay. It takes guts, and
principles, to turn money away and
concentrate solely on investment performance. But that's precisely what many smaller investment
boutiques do on a regular
basis.
Has the manager invested his own money? If he hasn't, why should you?
Meaningful personal investment
is by itself no guarantee of investment outperformance, but it shows the most basic alignment of
interests between manager and
investor.
Is it independent, and owner-managed? David Swensen has gone on
record saying he prefers the
smaller, private partnership over the larger, listed full service operator. How many mouths must your
fees go on to feed?
Is the firm an asset manager, or an asset gatherer? This gets to the heart of the challenge
facing investors today. The
investment world is polarised between asset managers, who focus their energies on delivering the best
possible returns for their
clients, and asset gatherers, who just want to maximize the number of clients. Most fund management
firms fall into the latter
category. Favour the former.
How to distinguish between the asset managers and
the asset gatherers? Try to
find managers like the celebrated investor Jean-Marie Eveillard, who once remarked:
"I would rather lose half
of my shareholders than half of my shareholders' money."
A notorious 'victim'
of reverse PR was Adam Neumann,
founder of the office leasing company WeWork, which will likely go down in history as the high water
mark for Dotcom Insanity 2.0.
Says FT Alphaville's Jamie Powell:
"The following is a guest post by a
successful reader of Alphaville who
wishes to remain anonymous.
"A common complaint among my generation is that
essential services like housing,
education and transport have become so expensive that we've been excluded from enjoying the secure
lifestyles many had before in their
adult lives.
"However, I have proven the doubters wrong. By following some
simple rules in life, I have
retired at the age of 40 with enough money in the bank to live until I die.
"I
know you all desperately want
to know how I achieved such an astonishing feat, so here are the rules I followed which you too, dear
reader, can emulate:
"Make coffee at home. You won't believe what a $3.50 saving a day will do to your bank
account over the longer
term.
"Keep holidays cheap. I never spent more than $600 on a trip, which meant
exploring my local areas a
lot more on my time off.
"Bring pack lunches to work. Have you ever considered
how expensive Pret a Manger
is? Think about it.
"Take public transport. Uber should be saved for special
occasions only. Trust me, it
makes a big difference.
"Invest in passive funds. Pick those indexes with the
lowest fees, such as those
provided by Vanguard, and allocate your money every month. Compound interest is the greatest force known
to man.
"Bro down. Found a preposterous shared office space economy, build it with no regard for
its underlying economics, secure
an obscene valuation from a gullible capitalist, run it into the ground, and walk away with $1bn in
stock sales and a $185m consulting
contract.
"It literally is the easiest thing. Anyone can do it. Even
you."
Touché.
The story of WeWork really is a peach. For quasi-forensic analysis of
the debacle, take Professor
Scott Galloway's tech blog, No Mercy / No Malice, which is simply a must-read. Scott nails the WeWork
insanity (almost entirely
fuelled by SoftBank) in commentary dating from September 20th 2019; the fate of WeWork was already the
chronicle of a death foretold
(by Scott, amongst others):
"This was a case of immunities kicking in after the
requisite SEC disclosure. As
the greater fool theory has hit a wall, We will now need additional capital from the private markets,
who are no longer under the
influence. The firm will be forced to sell equity/issue debt at a price substantially lower than they
had anticipated. A price
unimaginable just 30 days ago.
"We has gone from unicorn to distressed asset in
30 days. In just seven days,
We lost more value than the three biggest losers in the S&P 500 have lost in the last year combined:
Macy's, Nektar Therapeutics,
and Kraft Heinz.
"So, as a distressed asset, the playbook is fairly
clear:
"Bring in
new management. What got We here, isn't going to get it where it needs to go. Each layer that comes off
the We onion stinks more and
more. The media has turned its attention to the Neumanns, and it's as if the lights have been turned on
at a cocaine-fuelled party
that ended several hours too late. Everyone and everything suddenly looks bad, scary even.
The firm needs to bust a move
to break even pronto. The new CEO should be from a REIT, ideally a hospitality or commercial real estate
REIT. My vote is Adam
Markman, CFO of Equity Commonwealth – Sam Zell's firm.
"Shed/close all non-core
businesses. WeGrow and WeLive
are vanity projects. As someone close to the firm told me yesterday, they distract Mr.Neumann from the
core business, where he was
wreaking havoc. A $13 million investment in a firm that makes wave pools to indulge Adam's passion for
surfing. Really?
Really?
"Raise money after an adult conversation with SoftBank ("You f*cked up,
you trusted us. Do you want
to participate in the next round or get washed out?")
"Focus on margin
expansion vs. growth. We has a
differentiated product in the marketplace, and should command a premium.
"Lay
off all employees not directly
tied to managing the core business. Reprice options for remaining employees, as the current options are
now worthless and most execs
will begin looking for other jobs. The most talented (the ones with the most options) will be the first
to leave if they aren't given
substantial economics for staying in Saigon as the North Vietnamese roll into town.
"3-5 new independent
directors. Boards have their own dynamic, irrespective of the qualities of the individuals. The members
of this board have formidable
experience/CVs. Lew Frankfort (Director) is a first-ballot Hall of Fame retail exec, and he doesn't
strike me as the type of guy who'd
be bullied by the CEO, or anybody else for that matter. Again, I just can't figure out what the f*ck
happened here. Who is the head of
the audit committee, and was he (they were all dudes until last week) the one passing out MDMA before
each audit meeting? Or, as a
private firm, did they even have audit committee meetings? This is a board that approved a $13 million
acquisition of a wave pool
company. Or did they?
"The directors enabled an information pyramid scheme and
indulged Adam, in exchange for
hoping they could create enough valuation momentum, via nine rounds, to carry their shares to an exit in
the public
markets.
"SoftBank was reportedly considering propping up the IPO with $750
million in share purchases at the
offering price. If that's the case, shouldn't they want to invest billions more at the now low-low
80%-off price? Or were they simply
looking to pump and dump?
"The above likely won't happen. Why? As I said
[before] the lines between vision,
bullsh*t, and fraud are pretty narrow. I can't wrap my head around what's gone on here. Something is
wrong. Something stinks.
Something...Just. Doesn't. Add. Up.
"It's beginning to smell like malfeasance
at We. The lines between
vision, bullsh*t, and fraud have been crossed here. To be clear, I'm not a journalist, nor a forensic
accountant. This is pure
speculation based on my experience as a CEO, investor, and director. Something is very, very wrong
here."
Avoiding high profile corporate disasters is less of a problem for investors well diversified by asset
class, with portfolio
protection (we favour precious metals and systematic trend-following funds), and who have a preference
for attractive individual
securities over the ownership of entire indices or markets. In any event, we have all been well and
truly warned.
Not all that glitters is gold.











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